Abstract: Although a number of economists have tried to revive the idea of nominal GDP targeting since the financial crisis of 2008, very little has been said about how this objective might be achieved in practice. This paper adopts and extends a strategy first outlined by Holbrook Working (1923) and later employed by Hallman, et al. (1991) in the P-Star model. It presents a series of theoretical and empirical results to argue that Divisia monetary aggregates can be controlled by the Federal Reserve and that the trend velocities of these aggregates exhibit the stability required to make long-run targeting feasible.
Although stabilizing nominal GDP has been suggested before as an objective for monetary policy actions, an increasing number of economists have tried to revive the idea since the financial crisis of 2008 and the apparent ineffectiveness of manipulating the federal funds rate when the zero bound constraint has been met. But while the merits of nominal GDP stabilization as a final objective for monetary policy have been emphasized in recent discussions, very little has been said about how this goal might be achieved in practice.
Indeed, whereas earlier discussions offered explicit strategies and established linkages between, for example, nominal GDP and the monetary base (see, e.g., McCallum (1988) and Meltzer (1987) ) or a broader monetary aggregate (Feldstein and Stock (1994) ), the recent discussions have been relatively strong on the goal and relatively silent on how a path to the goal might be implemented. 1 Indeed, with the recent innovations of payment of interest on reserves and unusual behavior of the monetary base in the aftermath of the financial crisis, even thoughts of reviving some of the older, well-articulated strategies have been put on hold.
Thus, for all of the attention that nominal GDP targeting has received as a potential goal for monetary policy, a practical means of achieving that end has yet to be offered. 2 In this paper we propose a strategy for nominal GDP targeting based on a framework first outlined by Holbrook Working (1923) and used, with only minor modifications, by Hallman, et al. (1991) in the P-Star model. In these earlier applications, a policymaker is able to evaluate whether a value for the money stock is consistent with long-run price stability.
Using essentially the same derivation found in Working's original paper and making appropriate changes to the practical adaptations employed by Hallman et al., we find a path for money that is consistent with any desired long-run trajectory for nominal GDP. Unlike 1 An exception is Sumner (1989 Sumner ( , 1995 and the suggestion of implementing monetary policy through the use of a nominal GDP futures market.
For a survey of issues regarding nominal GDP targeting, see Bean (1983) . Clark (1994) offers some evidence on lagged adjustment v. forecast adjustment rules when NGDP targeting is implemented.
previous applications of this framework, we employ Divisia monetary aggregates in establishing a path for money that the central bank should try to maintain and use a one-sided filtering algorithm that can be implemented in real time to control for slow-moving trends in velocity. 3 In what follows, we first explain the basic analytics of Working's framework and how we have adapted it to nominal GDP. Then, after reproducing Hallman et al. ' s regression results to show that movements in the Divisia aggregates consistently anticipate movements in nominal income over a sample period that extends from 1967 through the present, we compare actual paths for the Divisia monetary aggregates to alternative trajectories that, according to our framework, would have been consistent with more stable nominal GDP growth since 1985.
After using this comparison to discuss, in particular, the stance of current monetary policy, we examine how the Fed might control the behavior of these Divisia aggregates within an intermediate targeting strategy. Overall, we conclude that if nominal GDP is chosen as the central bank's objective (a question on which this paper takes no position), the strategy outlined in this paper has several virtues: It is transparent to outside observers, it is forwardlooking, and yet it can be implemented in a fairly straight-forward manner. 4 In fact, one might speculate that one reason for the demise of the P-star model was the postsample instability of the velocity of M2, something which can be traced to the financial innovations era but can be attributed more specifically to the problems inherent in simple sum aggregation methods that fail to internalize pure substitution effects and would have been a consequence of such things as the payment of interest on deposits, the availability of a broader array of deposit accounts, and the greater substitution among these accounts by consumers in response to changes in user costs. In this context, it is interesting to note that Working, nearly ninety years ago, devoted an appendix of his paper to an attempt to create an "Index for a Medium of Exchange." Even though he was writing long before the era of financial innovations and the payment of interest on checkable deposits, he intuited that different components of a monetary aggregate should be weighted differently and in this appendix he made an early attempt to do just that.
One reason we take no position on the desirability of NGDP targeting is the results in West (1986) . Using a model presented in Bean (1983) , West demonstrated that the preference of NGDP targeting over, say, money supply targeting depends on values of certain parameters and, a priori, there is no clear reason to believe why those should take a value that would lead a policymaker to prefer one option over the other. We also take no position on whether targeting the level of nominal GDP is to be preferred to targeting the growth rate of NGDP. Throughout, our purpose is derive a practical approach to targeting the level of NGDP if that is to become the central bank's adopted goal.
Working's Framework
Working's (1923) objective was to find a value for the money supply that would be consistent with long-run price stability. At the time of his writing, many others had investigated Quantity Theory relationships empirically. 5 From this research, strategies to stabilize the price level emerged but even Fisher's (1920) plan did not incorporate a method for dealing with lags in the process. Thus, Working's innovation was to recognize the role of lags and to establish a policy framework that embedded a long-run desired path for price stability.
A central bank then could compare the current price level against the desired long-run path and evaluate whether the stance of policy was too accommodative or too restrictive.
Using Quantity Theory relationships, Working re-wrote the basic expression as (V/T) = (P/M). Because (P/M) did not have a "definite conception," Working dealt with its reciprocal.
To find a long-run path for it, he estimated a trend value for the price level using a regression of the log value of the price level on time, time squared, and time cubed; future values for the price level were extrapolations from this trend regression. With this information, Working then could plot, on a log scale, values for (M/P) to illustrate the value of circulating medium that would be consistent with his long-run trend path for the aggregate price level.
In adapting Working's framework for the P-Star model, Hallman, et al. (1991) expressed their basic relationship as:
(1) P * t = (M2tV * t)/Q * t.
In this expression, P * t is the long-run target value for the price level at time t, V * t, is the longrun equilibrium value for velocity, taken by Hallman, et al, to be the sample mean for M2 velocity, and Q * t is the value for potential real GDP at time t. 6 Rearranging terms so as to apply For more background, see the surveys in Humphrey (1973) and Laidler (2011) .
Although Taylor (1993) published his famous paper on a rule for the implementation of monetary policy after the P-star paper was published, he did not cite it. Nonetheless, he had this to say about an alternative rule in that paper (pp. 209 -210) : "Since the mid-1970s monetary targets have been used in many countries to state targets for inflation. If money velocity were stable, then, given an estimate of potential output growth, money targets would imply a target for the price level; given velocity and a real output target, the target price level would obviously fall out algebraically from the money supply target. Even though the 1980s the framework more directly to nominal income targeting and making some desirable changes in empirical choices, the framework to be employed in this paper is:
where PQ * t is the long-run target value for nominal GDP, Mt is the value of a Divisia monetary aggregate, and V * t is trend velocity for that chosen monetary aggregate. Equation (2) Meanwhile, the use of a Divisia monetary aggregate in (2) in place of simple-sum M2 in (1) is motivated by Barnett's (1980) classic work, which introduced monetary economists to the logic behind, and the practical benefits of, Divisia monetary aggregation; this empirical choice also distinguishes our approach from that of Feldstein and Stock (1994) In (2), we also depart from the P-star framework in yet another way, by calculating trend velocity V * t using the one-sided version of the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter described by Stock and Watson (1999) . Figure 1 uses quarterly data to compare the actual velocities of Divisia M1 and MZM to the trend values obtained with this one-sided H-P filter. 8 The choice, both here and below, to focus on M1 and MZM together allows us to assess the robustness of our findings to the choice of narrow versus broad monetary aggregates. Our series on Divisia have shown that money velocity is not stable in the short run, the long-run stability of the velocity of some monetary measures allows one to state targets for the price level. For example, with an estimated secular growth of real output of 2.5 percent and a steady velocity, a money growth range of 2.5 percent to 6.5 percent -the Fed's targets for 1992 -would imply that the price level target grows at 0 to 4 percent per year. Given biases such as index number problems in measuring prices, the 2-percent per year implicit target inflation rate is probably very close to price stability or 'zero' inflation."
7 For a more recent discussion and survey of the extensive literature on the Divisia monetary aggregates, see Barnett (2012) .
The MZM aggregate -"money, zero maturity" -includes those assets in M2, less small time deposits, plus institution-only money market mutual funds. It first was discussed in detail by Motley (1988) , who referred to it as "non-term M3." It later picked up the label of MZM. we also replicated the analysis using Anderson and Jones' Divisia M2 series, as well as the much broader, Divisia M4 aggregate provided by the Center for Financial Stability and described in Barnett, et al. (2012) .
The graphs in Figure 1 reveal quite clearly the shifting, but slow-moving, trends in velocities that, Reynard (2007) finds, must be accounted for in identifying the long-run linkages between money and prices, not just in the U.S. but in Switzerland and the Euro Area as well. 9
Our one-sided version of the H-P filter imposes the same setting λ = 1600 for the smoothing parameter as is commonly used in the two-sided H-P filter for quarterly data. It produces a similar, but somewhat more volatile, measure of the trend, reflecting the fact that, unlike the standard H-P filter, the one-sided variant only uses data up through period t in constructing the value for the trend at period t. This feature, however, is precisely what allows our algorithm to be implemented in real time and also makes our measure suitable for use in the forecasting equations described below. An added advantage of this one-side filter is that once the parameter λ is fixed, no additional parameters need to be estimated or calibrated in constructing the series for trend velocity: As explained by Stock and Watson (1999, p. 301 ), values for the trend can be generated quickly and easily using the equations of the standard Kalman filter.
Otherwise, equation (2) and the lagged value of the price gap, defined as the difference between p * t and pt, the natural logarithms of P * t and Pt, and rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the lagged price gap equals zero. Here, similarly, we regress Δ 2 pqt, the change in nominal income growth (and hence the analog to Hallman et al.'s Δ t = Δ 2 pt, the change in the inflation rate) on four of its own quarterly lags and on the lagged value of the nominal income gap, defined as the difference between pq * t, the natural log of the nominal income target in (2), and pqt, the log of the actual value of nominal GDP during period t.
Although the availability of data on the Divisia monetary aggregates pushes the starting date for our own quarterly sample ahead to 1967.1, we can now extend that sample well beyond Hallman et al.'s, all the way through 2012.3. Our estimates, with the absolute value of the associated t statistic below each coefficient, are
for Divisia M1 and
for Divisia MZM. 10 In both cases, the large and statistically significant coefficient on the lagged nominal GDP gap indicates that nominal income growth accelerates when the gap is positive and decelerates when the gap is negative, so that actual nominal GDP converges over time to the long-run target defined in (2). Table 1 shows, additionally, that the lagged nominal GDP 10 Again following Hallman et al. (1991) , quarterly changes in nominal GDP growth are multiplied by 400, so that they are expressed in annualized percentage points, and the nominal GDP gap is multiplied by 100, so that it is measured in percentage points, in these regressions.
A constant term, shown in table 1 but not in the equations as displayed here, is also included in each regression. In summary, the foregoing discussion has tried to establish that monetary policy has the potential to hit a long-run path for nominal GDP if it can control the behavior of a Divisia monetary aggregate that would keep nominal GDP on such a target path. It is to this question of monetary control we now turn.
Money Multipliers for Simple Sum and Divisia Aggregates
Spindt (1983) extends Barnett's (1980) work by deriving general expressions for the multipliers of Divisia monetary aggregates. Here, these expressions are reproduced for the special case of aggregates formed from currency and a single type of interest-bearing deposit.
The results make clear how the appearance of user-cost terms in the budget-share weights of the Divisia index can -and seemingly do -help dampen volatility in the behavior of its companion multiplier. A series of numerical examples, based on these expressions together with a model of the demand for currency and deposits drawn from Belongia and Ireland (2012) , reveals that for a wide range of plausible parameterizations, the multiplier for the Divisia monetary aggregate is likely to more stable than the multiplier for the corresponding simple sum measure. We find that this same pattern appears in the U.S. data. 
Equation (8) depicts the textbook result that the money multiplier depends inversely on both the currency-deposit ratio and the reserve ratio.
Because Divisia indexes are growth rate indexes, however, it is useful for the sake of comparison to express the multiplier for the simple sum aggregate in its less familiar growth rate form as well. Spindt (1983) accomplishes this task using the approximations
for the growth rates of the simple sum aggregate and the money base, where
represent the quantity shares of deposits and currency in the simple sum aggregate and, analogously, 
restating (8) 
where (16) replaces the quantity shares that appear in (9) with expenditure shares on the monetary services provided by deposits and currency. These shares are computed using Barnett's (1978) . 1
Equations (10), (13), (14), (16), (20), and (21) Spindt (1983) shows how (22) extends to the more general case, with multiple types of deposits and reserve assets.
Comparing (15) and (22) provided by an additional dollar in currency and will, in that sense, view deposits and currency as perfect substitutes at the margin. Equations (15) and (22) indicate that movements in the reserve ratio t r affect the multipliers for the Divisia and simple sum aggregates symmetrically.
Since 1 t u > whenever deposits do pay interest, however, the first term inside brackets on the right-hand side of (22) will typically be a larger positive number than the corresponding term in (15), suggesting that, in particular, a decrease in the currency-deposit ratio t k that increases the money multiplier for the simple sum aggregate will tend to produce a smaller-sized increase in the money multiplier for the Divisia aggregate.
Two observations, however, force us to stop short of using this comparison between (15) and (22) To resolve these ambiguities, we combine (15) and (22), which are, by themselves, simply accounting formulas that identify the more fundamental determinants of the money multipliers, with elements drawn from the more detailed, general equilibrium model of the demand for monetary assets presented in Belongia and Ireland (2012 
1 , 1
a relation that associates an increase in the opportunity cost of currency relative to deposits with a decline in currency-deposit ratio. Equation (24) can be combined with either (15) or (22) to obtain a model of how the money multiplier for either the simple sum or the Divisia aggregate changes in response to movements in the currency-deposit ratio that are ultimately As noted in Belongia and Ireland (2012) , the price aggregator (15), (22), and (24) numerically.
With the model thereby calibrated for both M1 and MZM cases, data. For the same period used in the calibration exercise, and for three additional sample periods considered in the forecasting exercises below, the money multiplier for the Divisia M1
or MZM aggregate has a standard deviation that is smaller than that of the multiplier for the corresponding simple sum measure. Whether these smaller month-to-month movements in the Divisia money multiplier are also forecastable is the subject of the next section.
Forecasting Experiments
The multiplier relationships explored above suggest several hypotheses and related experiments that would update the results reported by Spindt (1984) . Because one of the potential errors that could move GDP off the target path would be control errors that result from an inability to forecast movements in the Divisia money multiplier out-of-sample, our 1979 -1982) . The second estimation period ends at the time of the Y2K injection of reserves such that the forecast period covers a sample period when the Fed was draining reserves from the system and then dealing with a recession that may have been caused by its excessively restrictive actions post-Y2K. 14 The third estimation period spans the Great Moderation and ends just prior to the onset of the most recent downturn; most notably, however, this is a period in which any emphasis on money and monetary control had disappeared from discussions of monetary policy.
Before proceeding with the forecasting experiment, it is instructive to present the data in broad overview. Also, because of the wholesale changes in financial markets that occurred in the early 1980s, these summary statistics are reported for three sample periods: 1967. 01 -1979.09, 1984.01 -1999.12 , and the entire 1967.01 -2007.12 period under study. Although the data in Table 4 reveal very broad similarities across alternative money multipliers and over time, the multiplier derived from non-borrowed reserves exhibits a standard deviation that is substantially larger than that of the base or adjusted reserves; somewhat surprisingly, this result prevails even in the sample period prior to the advent of financial innovations. On its face this does not mean that non-borrowed reserves cannot be used as the central bank's instrument of control or that movements in this multiplier cannot be forecasted out-of-sample, but its consistently larger standard deviation is something to note as the forecasting exercises are undertaken.
The results of the static forecasts are reported in Table 5 . Because the foregoing examples for nominal GDP examined only Divisia M1 and MZM we limit our analysis to those variables but these analytics could be applied to other Divisia aggregates as well. Again, we conduct the forecasting experiment over three different periods of time to minimize the chances that any particular result is due to happenstance. 15 Variables chosen to represent the central bank's policy instrument (H) in each table include adjusted reserves (ADJ RES), nonborrowed
In the middle of this estimation period, the Fed reduced reserve requirements on demand deposits from twelve to ten percent in April 1992 and eliminated reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits in December 1990.
For example, the relatively low and stable rates of base/reserves/money growth over the last decade may introduce an "illusion" of more precise monetary control. Stability in inflation and interest rates coupled with generally stable real growth also could contribute to this illusion. Or, these results may suggest that the standard money multiplier model be re-examined in the context of modern institutional arrangements with special attention to changes that would tend to enhance monetary control. The results for the Divisia measure of M1 and the four variables used to represent the Fed's policy instrument indicate that, in all cases and across all sample periods, the monetary base multiplier is associated with the smallest MAE and RMSE. Moreover, in many cases, the error statistics for the base multiplier are an order of magnitude smaller than those of the next closest competitor. Thus, if the Fed were to implement this particular approach to NGDP targeting with Divisia M1 as its guide, the monetary base would appear to be the policy instrument that would generate the smallest control error. With respect to the general results over sample periods, it is interesting to note that, for the most part, the forecast errors are not markedly different across time. This result is surprising because the introduction of new bank liabilities not subject to reserve requirements, the increasing use of "sweep" activities by banks, and the reduction in reserve requirements more generally should have made monetary control subject to larger errors.
The Divisia MZM Aggregate
Results for the MZM multipliers indicate that, as for Divisia M1, the multiplier derived from the monetary base produces the lowest forecast errors for each of the three sample periods and those errors are lower by a substantial margin compared to the three other alternatives. Also, as in the case of Divisia M1, the nonborrowed reserves instrument produces the highest MAE and RMSE values. Finally, it is interesting to note that the control errors for the much broader MZM liabilities grouping are similar to those for the narrow M1 aggregate.
Thus, while one reason to choose between a narrow and broad intermediate target often is how closely it is associated with the central bank's instrument of control, there is nothing in Table 5 that would lead one to prefer strongly one Divisia measure to the other; it seems as if the central bank could use the monetary base to influence the path of either with comparable success.
The Recent Financial Crisis and Monetary Control
The foregoing experiments all were conducted over sample periods prior to the recent been directing its efforts to targeting the federal funds rate which, by construction, has allowed money to vary freely, the same observer could conclude that much could be done to tighten the link between the adjusted monetary base and the monetary aggregates if the Fed wished to control their behavior rather than the funds rate.
Conclusion
Because monetary policy, when implemented by manipulation of the federal funds rate, has been viewed to be impotent when the funds rate reaches its zero bound, some observers have suggested that the Fed attempt to meet its dual mandate by setting a target for nominal GDP. While taking no position on the merits of nominal GDP targeting relative to alternatives that stabilize the price level or the money supply instead, this paper modifies a framework suggested by Working (1923) and similar to that of the P-Star model and illustrates how it might be used to target nominal income. It shows that the central bank can use the monetary base to control the path for either a narrow or broad Divisia monetary aggregate and, through this device, it can keep nominal GDP growing along any desired long-run path. The framework is built on traditional, Quantity Theoretic, foundations, and draws directly from Barnett's (1980) 
